THE STOLEN REVOLUTION

In a scene reminiscent of Assad’s Syrian brutal repression of his people, Egypt’s security forces open fire, gunned down, killed and wounded many Muslim Brotherhood supporters as they were praying Subh – dawn prayers. Once again, the military is betraying the revolution.

THE COUP

Egypt’s  military has once again further empowered the forces of the "deep state" -  the makhzen, the remnants, Mubarak’s holdovers  the filul - those groups of politicians, generals and business owners that were allied to the regime of Hosni Mubarak, and who have continued to command influence among the poor and ignorant.  These well-financed groups played an important part in persistently inciting against President Morsi over the past year, and the mass anti-Morsi demonstrations. These forces are coming back with vengeance, after the revolution and after Islamist-led administration tried to strip them of their power, interests and influence.

The military has in achieving the coup defined  itself as  the protector of Egypt’s “deepest state”, the political and economic elite that surrounds, is managed by and serves it.

Egypt’s general as always claims that the military does not want to play a political role or to rule Egypt but the military said that last time too, and yet continued to rule quite brutally for more than another year until President Morsi managed to send them to their barracks. 

The military in control means that US influence is great  because the Egyptian military is wholly dependent on the US for economic funding and support. The Egyptian military receives $1.3bn in US tax dollars every year in full and on time.

THE TAMARRUD

The opposition now believe if they mobilize a discontented majority mass , and if the military elites supports them,  they can overthrow any elected leadership, throw the elected leaders in prison, and reset an entire political process.

The January 25 revolution repudiated the Mubarak regime, while the June 30 revolution has handed back the reins of power to an  anti-Muslim Brotherhood  coalition of Mubarak remnants and secular elites supported by most Copts.

To overthrow an elected president and government by assessment based on Morsi’s competence is so questionable  because the secular opposition, including the Mubarak residue and the Coptic minority, were ever unwilling to live in an Egypt that was governed by Islamists. The old Mubarak sectors of the government that remained in place, including the judiciary, the police, and the interior ministry, threw every possible roadblock in the path of Morsi’s governing policies.

Motivations of those  who demonstrated against continued Muslim Brotherhood rule had to be diverse. Anxieties at the economic state of the country, or that the Muslim Brotherhood was simply incompetent in government. Others were fearful of  ikhwanat al-daula (Ikhwanisation of the state) would lead to  Islamist domination. Many Christians felt citizenship was at stake. Others for freedom of expression in the face of the  Muslim Brotherhood. Meanwhile the security state’s semi-clandestine campaign bolstered the Tamarrud movement. The military or previously called SCAF  strategy  comes at a terrible price in lives lost during the inevitable strife that follows.  

Coup leaders conveniently ignore the fact that Egypt has suffered from a general lawlessness that began once the uprising against Hosni Mubarak ended, and well before Morsi's term began. Morsi government did not have complete control over corrupt, Mubarak-era security forces - many of whom have been openly and secretly protesting against Morsi.

Egypt's opposition are responsible for much of the organized violence witnessed recently. The presidential palace was repeatedly firebombed last December, and other government buildings, 30 Muslim Brotherhood offices, and four Muslim Brotherhood buses have been attacked and burnt. The victims have always been Brotherhood supporters.

Coup leaders lament the state of the Egyptian economy, placing the blame squarely on Morsi.  But the Morsi administration has had to endure constant instability, which has discouraged investment and tourism. The first calls for a "revolution" to topple Morsi began last August, just weeks after he was elected, and the opposition have proclaimed their very intention outrightly then to bring Morsi down by whatever means.

The coup leaders are  determined to again eradicate or drive the Muslim Brotherhood underground. They would dispose the Freedom and Justice party stalwarts with the starkest of alternatives, insurgency or surrender. The new temporary leadership is moving toward extreme polarization and the political suppression of the Islamically oriented.  None of them wants to acknowledge Morsi’s posture in rejecting the military takeover, urging nonviolent resistance and Morsi’s action within the law.

The Tamarrud rebels are championing Mubarak and his regime’s core legacy – “anything but the Brotherhood”,  yasqut yasqut hukm al-murshid - a call to overthrow the Muslim Brotherhood's Supreme Guide.  Mubarak  must now be a cheerier for “his children” has come  out in the open. For all of their apparent and vociferous  hatred of Mubarak and his regime, the Tamarrud rebels have shown to be the faithful followers of his core legacy – anything but the Brotherhood.

The Tamarrud protesters abandoned two key democratic principles- respect for the ballot box and the non-intervention of the military in politics. If the Tamarrud movement  really had 22 million supporters, then that should have been translated into votes in parliamentary elections scheduled by President Morsi for later this year, to bring Morsi down.

This is not a victory for freedom but for the old regime, the filul, or the makhzen, the Egyptian “deep-state”- a bureaucratic, military, and business elite, that never really went away. Liberal secularists in Egypt have decided that the offer from the “deep state” is preferable to a full democracy, which denies a  level playing field for the Muslim Brotherhood.

It envisages a “democracy” for everyone except Islamists although Egypt has a large community of Muslim believers. It is a ridiculous denial of the Brotherhood  in Egyptian society and narrative, which is a hugely popular and socially-embedded movement. President Morsi and the Brotherhood, after undergoing long and harsh persecution and its own internal debates endorsed the democratic electoral process. Surely, to be a Muslim democrat is not to be hopelessly naive.

The world may like to but can never forget Algeria 1991-92 and the Palestinian elections of 2006. The stinging perception is that Islamists winning the ballot box keep being toppled undemocratically.

This time, the sitting president was not a US-backed military dictator kept in power by US funding and political support. This time, the deposed president Morsi was Egypt’s first democratically and popularly elected president in several generations. 

THE COUP PLAYERS

The transitional leadership is symbolically shown by  figures like the Coptic Pope and the Sheikh al-Azhar who were stalwarts of the old regime. The interim President, Adly Mansour was  the first Mubarak appointee to the Supreme Constitutional Court. Every judge in that court was appointed by the Mubarak regime. Adly Mansour remains a hold-over from the Mubarak dictatorship and can never be a representative of the revolution.

As for El Baradei, and senior Tamarrud leaders, they rode “democracy” on the back of army tanks. El Baradei himself is one of the failed candidates for the presidency.  It is glaringly ironic to see Mohamed El Baradei reject popular elections claiming it was conducted under military rule, only to accept a direct appointment by none other than the military themselves. The appointment of El Baradei is said to appease the US and everyone knows that he served them well, allowing for the invasion of Iraq when he was in the IAEA. El Baradei has so little support that he needed the army to put him in office

El-Baradei should have been the first to call for Morsi’s release. But neither El-Baradei nor Sabbahi will be or can be iconic leaders. So they support the anti-Ikhwan purge  because detained Islamist leaders seem to have no inviolable rights and Islamist politicians are destined to be imprisoned.

The opposition compact was simply to bring down the Morsi government with no clear leader, no agreed and no clear platform. Its diverse and ideologically contradictory makeup is disturbing. Participants include Mubarak holdovers from the military and judiciary to police, security, bureaucracy, former losing presidential candidates like Amr Musa; Egypt's illiberal secularists; disaffected April Spring youth; religious leaders, Grand Sheikh of al-Azhar and himself a former member of the Mubarak-led National Democratic Party as well the heads of the Salafist Nour Party and the Coptic church.  

It is indeed a strange bed to have  the Copts, the extreme secularists and the salafists sleeping together.

THE IKHWAN

The Brotherhood, for decades living in siege and faced with repression, learned to survive and prove the only significant opposition during the Mubarak years. The Brotherhood had deliberated, debated heatedly, dithered and hesitated on whether to take the leading role  in the post revolutionary order. It was late in the stage that it took on a highly political risk and went ahead to contest all the elections. The Brotherhood through the Freedom and Justice Party and its candidate Dr Morsi won all 14 rounds of voting  at legislative, presidential elections and constitutional referendums proving itself worthy of winning the ballot box.

The Morsi government attempted at governance, in building a representative coalition in the very complex political and economic climate post January 25. The risk and gamble of transitioning in a post revolutionary Egypt were tremendous where so many “deep state” institutions and agencies remained part of the Mubarak legacy.  Despite various accomplishments, the Morsi government and the Brotherhood were unable to move quickly and effectively to garner sufficient popular support which enabled extreme anti-Brotherhood factions, bent on bringing it down, to mobilize diverse sectors of society littered with suspicion and grievances.

The Ikhwan has to stay the course, remain steadfast and persevere despite all the severe repressions and provocations for they have to respect the fact that they were the choice of the people of Egypt to lead them and to  retrieve a stolen revolution.

(gathered from various news reports)