Scott MacLeod,
Mohammed Morsi's victory over Ahmed Shafik in the Egyptian
presidential election is a political triumph for the Muslim Brotherhood, a
banned organization for most of the years since the country became a republic
in 1953. It is likewise an important victory for Egyptian and Middle East
democracy. Having edged perilously close to the brink of political chaos in
recent weeks, due to repeated bungling of the transition process, Egypt has
taken a very significant stride forward.
Morsi and his group have earned a substantial role in
Egyptian public life. The Muslim Brotherhood has borne the brunt of state
repression throughout the regimes of Gamal Abdel Nasser, Anwar Sadat and Hosni
Mubarak. Its leaders and members persevered against difficult odds. They managed
to create a strong grassroots movement that provided social services and gave a
voice to the voiceless. They provided some hope during long, dark years when
Egyptian presidents offered none. In the face of intolerable state violence
spanning decades, the Brothers remained tolerant. They eschewed violence and
exhibited super human patience.
Thus, for Morsi, a U.S.-educated engineer, and the
Brotherhood, the results are a spectacular political achievement, attached with
profound symbolism. After 60 years of military rule upholding secular values,
Egypt has elected the first civilian president in its history, and its first
Islamist president, too. Morsi's victory is testimony to the Brotherhood's
ability to mobilize Egyptians against a deeply entrenched political system, and
to convince Egyptians that its candidate was the most capable of taking the
helm after Mubarak's removal from power. If it rises to its responsibilities,
the Brotherhood can be the hope of Egypt and of the Arab Spring.
The reason why Morsi's win is also a triumph for Egyptian
and Arab democracy is because of the critical, historic choice it represents.
When Egyptians went to the polls in the June 16-17 runoff election, they were
not primarily voting between a military candidate and an Islamist candidate.
They were choosing between the past and the future: a continuation of the
60-year-old Egyptian military regime, or a new system built on genuine
democratic participation.
Shafik is a man of doubtless abilities, having served as air
force commander, minister of civil aviation, and, finally, as Mubarak's last
prime minister. Yet, Shafik's resume was more a liability than an asset in a
country raising thundering demands for change. The millions who chose Shafik
wished that his iron fist and close ties to the military could restore
stability. His supporters are disappointed by the results, but that is nothing
compared to the rage that would have been expressed by millions of Egyptians
demanding an end to six decades of military rule if Shafik had won. At worst,
the perception of an election stolen by the military might have edged Egypt
toward an Algeria scenario; that country experienced a terrible civil war
triggered in 1991 when the military abruptly canceled elections Islamists were
poised to win.
By contrast, the Morsi victory is the kind of outcome that
elections in a democracy are supposed to produce-a winner who finds himself in
a political arena that promotes and requires negotiation, compromise,
concession and conciliation for the greater good of the nation. During the
previous era, when Mubarak regularly received 90 percent of the votes,
elections were nothing more than a farcical means of legitimizing the
continuation of a state security regime. Any negotiation with other sectors of
society- it occurred rarely-was on the regime's terms. That is what led to the
absolute ossification of Egyptian life, and, eventually, a revolution.
Instead, Morsi and the Brotherhood will find themselves in
perpetual negotiation with all of Egypt's players-with the Supreme Council of
the Armed Forces, Salafists, Coptic Christians, liberals, and even with Shafik
and his supporters. The process formally began last week, when Morsi announced
the formation of a national political front and proposed the establishment of a
national unity government. These moves underline the Brotherhood's
understanding of democratic concepts like consensus building and inclusiveness.
It is clear to most Egyptians that Morsi is doomed to fail
if he turns out to be a president who represents only the Brothers. Or, if he thinks the Brotherhood could or
should somehow hijack a revolution that involves a wide cross section of
Egyptians. Many Egyptians have serious and valid questions about the Brotherhood's
abilities, policies, and intentions-on issues from women's rights and the role
of religion in the state to readiness for foreign investment and other forms of
cooperation with outsiders. (Let's not forget, though, the problems Egyptians
had with the former regime that led them to revolt last year-political
repression, police torture, corruption, appalling medical care, horrendous
education system, the list goes on.)
The importance of representing all Egyptians can't be lost
on Morsi or his group's strategists. In the parliamentary elections earlier
this year, the Brotherhood's political arm, the Freedom and Justice Party,
garnered an impressive 10.1 million votes. In the first round of presidential
balloting just five months later, however, Morsi, the Brotherhood candidate,
won only 5.7 million-a downward slump indicating strong disillusionment with
the Islamists' performance in office. If we suppose that those 5.7 million
voters constitute the Brotherhood's core of diehard support, then Morsi's 13.2
million total in the runoff election means that he gained the backing of 7.7
million Egyptians who can easily desert the Brotherhood and vote for an
alternative the next time.
Morsi will need all the negotiating and consensus building
skills he can muster in the weeks and months ahead. Despite Morsi's
victory-and SCAF's evident and necessary
acquiescence in allowing it to stand-Egypt's revolution is hardly finished. The
ruling generals are showing extreme reluctance to hand over power to elected
civilians by July 1 as they once pledged to do. In the midst of the
presidential campaigning, SCAF enforced a court ruling dissolving the
Islamist-controlled parliament, issued a decree granting the military executive
powers and sharply curbing the authority of the new president, and gave itself a
central role in approving a new constitution being drafted by a 100-member
constituent assembly. Morsi's challenge is to use his powerful mandate as
Egypt's first popularly elected leader to guide all Egyptians, including the
reluctant generals, into a democratic future.
Scott MacLeod is managing editor of the Cairo Review of
Global Affairs and is a professor in the School of Global Affairs and Public
Policy at the American University in Cairo
No comments:
Post a Comment